الَّذِيthe (one)لاnotيَتَّصِفُcharacterizedبِوَحْدَةٍby unityوَلاand notكَثْرَةٍmultitudeوَلاnorوُجُودٍexistenceوَلاnorعَدَمٍnon-existence،,وَلاand notغَيْرَotherذَاكَthat,,بَلْbutهُوَit (is)الْحَقِيقَةُthe truthمِنْfromحَيْثُwhereهِيَit isهِيَit isكَمَاasيَذْكُرُهُmentioned byالرَّازِيِّAl-Raziتَلَقِّيًاreceivingلَهُfrom himعَنْfromابْنِIbnسِينََاSinaوَأَمْثَالِهِand his likesمِنْfromالْمُتَفَلْسِفَةِphilosophers
That which is characterized neither by unity nor multitude, nor by existence nor non-existence, nor by anything else; rather, it is the truth as it is, as mentioned by Al-Razi, receiving it from Ibn Sina and his like among the philosophers.
وَقَدAnd weبَسَطْنَاhave elaboratedالْكَلَامَthe discussionفِيonهَذَاthisالإِطْلاَقِconcept of unlimitednessوَالتَّقْيِيدِand restriction،,وَالْكُلِّيَّاتِand universalsوَالْجُزْئِيَّاتِand particularsفِيinمَوَاضِعَplacesغَيْرِotherهَذَاthisوَبَيَّنَاand we clarifiedمِنْofغَلَطَmistakesهَؤُلَاءِtheseفِيinذَاكَthatمَاwhatلَيْسَis notهَذَاthisمَوْضِعَهُits place
And we have elaborated on this concept of unlimitedness and restriction, and on universals and particulars in other places, and we have clarified the mistakes of those in that which is not relevant here.
وَإِنَّمَاAnd indeedالْمَقْصُودُthe intendedهُنَاhereالإِطْلاَقُthe concept of unlimitedness،,الْلَّفْظِيُّverbal،,وَهُوَand that isأَنْthatيَتَكَلَّمَone speaksبِاللَّفْظِwith the wordمُطْلَقًاabsolutelyعَنْaboutكُلِّallقَيْدٍconstraints،,وَهَذَاand thisلَاdoes notوُجُودٌexistلَهُfor it،,وَحِينَئِذٍand thenفَلَاthen noيَتَكَلَّمَone speaksأَحَدٌanyoneإِلَّاexceptبِكَلَامٍwith speechمُؤَلَّفٍcomposedمَقِيدٍrestrictedمَرتَبِطٍconnectedبَعْضِهِsome of itبِبَعْضٍto some،,فَتَكُونَso it becomesتِلْكَthoseقُيُودٌconstraintsمُمْتَنِعَةٌpreventingالإِطْلاَقَunlimitedness
And indeed, the intended meaning here is the verbal unlimitedness, which is that one speaks with the word absolutely without any constraints, and this does not exist; and then, no one speaks except with composed, restricted speech connected to one another, so those are constraints preventing unlimitedness.
فَتَبَيَّنَThen it is clearأَنَّهُthat itلَيْسَis notلِمَنْfor anyoneفَرْقٌto distinguishبَيْنَbetweenالْحَقِيقَةِthe truthوَالْمَجَازِand metaphorفَرْقٌa differenceمَعْقُولٌrationalيُمْكِنُthat canبِهِby itالْتَّمَيْيِزُto distinguishبَيْنَbetweenنَوْعَيْنِtwo types،,فَعُلِمَso it is knownأَنَّthatهَذَاthisالتَّقْسِيمَclassificationبَاطِلٌis voidوَحِينَئِذٍand thusفَكُلُّeveryلَفْظٍwordمَوْجُودٌthat existsفِيinكِتَابِthe Bookاللَّهِof Godوَرَسُولِهِand His Messengerفَإنَّهُindeed it isمَقِيدٌrestrictedبِمَاby that whichيُبَيِّنُclarifiesمَعْنَاهُits meaning،,فَلَيْسَthere is notفِيinشَيْءٍanythingمِنْofذَاكَthatمَجَازٌa metaphor،,بَلْbutكُلَّهُall of itحَقِيقَةٌis truth
Then it is clear that there is no distinction for anyone who differentiates between the truth and metaphor; hence, this classification is void. Therefore, every word that exists in the Book of God and His Messenger is indeed restricted to what clarifies its meaning, and there is nothing in that which is metaphor, but all of it is truth.
وَلِهَذَاAnd for this reasonلَمَّاwhenادَّعَىthey claimedكَثِيرٌmanyمِنَofالْمُتَأَخِّرِينَthe later scholarsأَنَّthatفِيinالْقُرْآنِthe Qur'anمَجَازًاthere is a metaphorوَذَكَرُواand they mentionedمَاwhatيَشْهَدُsupportsلَهُمْthem،,رُدَّit was refutedعَلَيْهِمُagainst themالْمُنَازِعُونَthe opponentsجَمِيعَallمَاwhatذَكَرُوهُthey mentioned
And for this reason, when many of the later scholars claimed that there is a metaphor in the Qur’an and mentioned what supports them, it was refuted against them by the opponents of all that they mentioned.
فَمَنْAmong the mostأَشْهَرَfamousمَاwhatذَكَرُوهُthey mentionedقَوْلُهُis the sayingتَعَالَىof the Exalted::جِدَارًاA wallيُرِيدُwantsأَنْtoيَنْقَضَّfall))[الكَهْفِ:(Al-Kahf: 78)
Among the most famous of what they mentioned is the saying of the Exalted: 'A wall wants to fall' (Al-Kahf: 78).
قَالُواThey said::وَالْجِدَارُand the wallلَيْسَis notبِحَيَوَانٍan animal،,وَالإِرَادَةُand the wantingإِنَّمَاis onlyتَكُونُforلِلْحَيَوَانِthe living،,فَاسْتِعْمَالُهَاso using itفِيinمَيْلِinclinationالْجِدَارِof the wallمَجَازٌis metaphorical.
They said: 'And the wall is not an animal, and the wanting is only for the living, so using it in the inclination of the wall is metaphorical.'
فَقِيلَIt was said to themلَهُمْto them::لَفْظٌThe termالإِرَادَةُ'wanting'قَدhasاستُعْمِلَbeen usedفِيinالمَيْلِthe inclinationالَّذِيwhichيَكُونُisمَعَهُwith itشُعُورٌawarenessوَهُوَand it isمَيْلٌinclinationالْحَيِّof the living،,وَفِيand inالمَيْلِthe inclinationالَّذِيwhichلَاdoes notشُعُورٌhaveفِيهِin itوَهُوَand it isمَيْلٌinclinationالْجُمَادِof the inanimate objects،,وَهُوَand it isمِنْfromمَشْهُورٍfamousاللُّغَةِthe language،,يُقَالُit is said::هَذَاthisالسَّقْفُroofيُرِيدُwantsأَنْtoيَقَعَfall،,وَهَذِهِand thisالْأَرْضُearthتُرِيدُwantsأَنْtoتُحَرَّثَbe tilled،,وَهَذَاand thisالزَّرْعُcropيُرِيدُwantsأَنْtoيُسْقَىbe watered،,وَهَذَاand thisالثَّمَرُfruitيُرِيدُwantsأَنْtoيُقَطَفَbe picked،,وَهَذَاand thisالثَّوْبُgarmentيُرِيدُwantsأَنْtoيُغْسَلَbe washed،,وَأَمْثَالٌand similarذَٰلِكَthings
It was said to them: 'The term "wanting" has been used in the inclination which includes awareness, which is the inclination of the living, and in the inclination that does not have awareness, which is the inclination of the inanimate; and it is known in the language, it is said: This roof wants to fall, and this earth wants to be tilled, and this crop wants to be watered, and this fruit wants to be picked, and this garment wants to be washed, and similar things.
وَاللَّفْظُAnd the termإِذَاifاسْتُعْمِلَusedفِيinمَعْنَيَيْنِtwo meaningsفَصَاعِدًاor more،,فَإِمَّاthen eitherأَنْthatيُجْعَلَit is madeحَقِيقَةًtrueفِيinأَحَدِهِمَاone of them،,مَجَازًاand metaphorical in the otherفِيor inالْآخَرِthe other،,أَوْorحَقِيقَةًtrueفِيinمَاwhatيَخْتَصُّis uniqueبِهِto itكُلٌّ مِّنْهُمَاeach of them،,فَيَكُونُso it becomesمُشْتَرَكًاsharedاشْتِرَاكًاby commonalityلَفْظِيًّاverbal،,أَوْorحَقِيقَةًtrueفِيinالْقَدْرِthe degreeالْمُشْتَرَكِshared
And the term, if used in two meanings or more, then either it is made true in one of them, metaphorical in the other, or it is true in what is unique to each of them, which would then make it verbally shared, or it is true in the degree that is common between them.
وَهِيَAnd those areالْأَسْمَاءُthe namesالْمُتَوَاطِئَةُthat share meanings،,وَهِيَand those areالْأَسْمَاءُthe namesالْعَامَّةُthe generalكُلُّهَاall،,وَعَلَىand based onالأَوَّلِthe firstيَلْزَمُit necessitatesالْمَجَازُmetaphor،,وَعَلَىand based onالثَّانِيthe secondيَلْزَمُit necessitatesالِاشْتِرَاكُcommonality،,وَكِلَاهُمَاand both areخِلَافَcontraryالْأَصْلِto the original،,فَوَجَبَso it is necessaryأَنْto
And those are the names that share meanings, and those are the general names altogether. Based on the first, it necessitates metaphor; and based on the second, it necessitates commonality, and both are contrary to the original. Therefore, it is necessary that it be from the shared meanings.
وَبِهَذَاand with thisيُعْرَفُone knowsعُمُومُthe generalالْأَسْمَاءُnamesالْعَامَّةُthe generalكُلُّهَاall،,وَإِلَّاotherwiseفَلَوْifقَالَa person saidقَائِلٌone who says::هُوَitفِيinمَيْلِthe inclinationالْجُمَادِof inanimate objectsحَقِيقَةٌis true،,وَفِيand inمَيْلٍthe inclination
And with this, one knows the generality of all names; otherwise, if a person says: 'It is true in the inclination of the inanimate objects,'